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COMMENTS
PAYMENT OF THE LIQUIDATED PORTION OF A DEBT
AS CONSIDERATION FOR THE DISCHARGE OF
THE ENTIRE CLAIM
In a recent Washington case, Paulsen Estate, Inc. v. NachesSelah IrrigationDistrict,' the Supreme Court was called upon to
decide whether the payment of the liquidated portion of a debt
was a sufficient consideration for the discharge of the remaining
part which was disputed by the parties. The court's decision that
the debtor was thereby discharged presents a phase of accord and
satisfaction which has had a peculiar history in this state.
The doctrine that payment by a debtor of a less sun' than the
1190 Wash. 205, 67 P. (2d) 856 (1937).
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whole amount of the debt will not extinguish the debt, although
the creditor expressly agrees to receive it in full payment, is well
established by abundant authority.2 The rule had its origin in
the famous dictum by Lord Coke in Pinnel's Case, 8 and although
it has been subjected to the severest criticism, the principle there
expressed has become rooted in the common law. In some jurisdictions, however, the rule has been modified or abrogated by statute,4
and in a few states the courts have expressly repudiated it.' Indeed, in view of the expressions of modern courts on the subject,
despite their steadfast adhesion to the general rule, it may be
safely conjectured that, if presented as an original proposition
today, it would find little, if any, support.
The reason for the rule is said to be that where part payment of
a liquidated and undisputed debt is accepted in full, no consideration exists for the express or implied promise of the creditor
to release the remainder of his debt. The debtor has done nothing
more than he was previously bound to do. No benefit having been
derived by the creditor, or detriment suffered by the debtor in
such a transaction, it is therefore a mere ntdum pactum. But the
orthodox rule became so unpopular that the courts soon began
to seize upon almost any circumstance to take a case out of the
operation of the rule. Thus the rule of accord and satisfaction
has established that if the debt is unliquidated or disputed, part
payment of the debt will extinguish the whole claim. This would
seem to satisfy the requirement of consideration in contracts; for,
by the payment of any sum on an unliquidated claim, the debtor
is risking the payment of a greater sum than the determination
of the amount of the claim in a suit brought for that purpose
might show to be due. Where the parties dispute the existence or
validity of the claim, the contention of the debtor may be correct,
and there may be no debt whatever. This possibility of an actual
detriment constitutes a sufficient consideration to sustain the agreement.
It is not necessary that the creditor expressly assent to the
'1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 120; RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 76 (a).
'5 Coke 117a, 77 Reprint 237 (1602).
'1 W LLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) 419, n. 9.
'Ibid. 419, n. 8. Washington at one time seemed about to join this
minority. In Brown v. Kern, 21 Wash. 211, 57 Pac. 798 (1899), the court,
after calling attention to the criticism of the rule, said: "It is certainly
not in accordance with ethics and ought not to be in accord with the
rules of law, to allow a creditor to enter into a contract to compromise
his debt or judgment, and by reason of that compromise receive an amount
of money which he could not have received except through the medium
of a compromise, and then allow him to violate his contract on the
plea of want of consideration and still retain the fruits of the agreement
which he made to compromise." This was merely dictum In this case
because the court actually found other consideration. There is similar
dicta also in Williams v. Blumenthal, 27 Wash. 24, 67 Pac. 393 (1901), and
in Baldwin v. Daly, 41 Wash. 416, 83 Pac. 724 (1906). The court has
subsequently ignored these cases without expressly overruling them
and now follows the majority rule. Plymouth Rubber Co. v. West
Coast Rubber Co., 131 Wash. 662, 231 Pac. 25 (1924); Graham v. New
York Life Insurance Co., 182 Wash. 612, 47 P. (2d) 958 (1935). See
generally, Shattuck, Accord and Satisfaction in Washington (1934), 8
WASH. L. REV. 112.
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acceptance of the lesser amount than that claimed by him, for it
is well settled that when the debt is unliquidated or in dispute and
the debtor sends the creditor a cheek for the lesser amount accompanied by a statement that it is in full satisfaction of the debt, the
acceptance and cashing of the check constitutes in law an assent
that the debt is paid in full.8 The fact that the creditor immediately notifies the debtor that he is accepting it merely as part payment has no effect, for the creditor is not permitted
to appropriate
7
the check without agreeing to the condition.
However, a more difficult problem is presented where the debtor
concedes that at least a certain sum is due on a claim that is otherwise unliquidated or in dispute. When the debtor pays more than
he concedes he owes then clearly there is sufficient consideration
to support a promise of the creditor to discharge the debt. But
it has been argued that this does not follow when the debter pays
only that amount which is admittedly due, since it is neither a
detriment to him nor a benefit to the creditor. Some courts have
been impressed with this argument and have thus held that part
payment discharges the debt pro tanto only, even though the payment is tendered and accepted in full settlement.8 While it must
be conceded that there is respectable authority for this position,
still the majority of courts have held that in such a case the
entire claim is discharged. 9
The reason for so holding is usually said to be that the whole
debt becomes unliquidated by the dispute as to the remaining part
and that therefore part payment will effect an accord and satisfaction. But perhaps the underlying reason is the growing dissatisfaction with the orthodox rule itself, and also the apparent disposition to grasp any fact or circumstance which will enable the
court to say that a particular case is not within the rule. The
spirit of the local decisions on the point reflects this attitude on
the part of the courts.
The case which first announced the majority rule in this state
0
is Pedersonv. Tacoma."
There the plaintiff was claiming for extra
work done under a contract with the city. The plaintiff contended
that since the city had awarded him $61,342 pursuant to a resolution of the city council, it admitted that at least that much was due
and thus there could be no accord and satisfaction of his claim
for $108,000. The court, however, found the city was claiming
that a sum much less than $61,342 was due and therefore the payment of the latter amount was an accord and satisfaction. In
so holding, the court said :1
"But if we may assume that the city agreed that
$61,342 was due and that the appellant was claiming
$108,000, the parties might agree upon either sum, and
that would be an accord and satisfaction. Where a claim

61 WLLISTON, CONrACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 1854; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 420.
'Ibid. § 1856; ibid. § 420.
sSee cases collected in 1 WuIEsToN, CoNTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) p. 439,
n. 2.

21bid. § 129; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)
:086 Wash. 164, 149 Pac. 643 (1915).
'Ibid. 167, 149 Pac. 644.

§ 420.
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is in dispute, the parties may agree upon an amount to be
paid, which amount when paid will constitute an accord
and satisfaction."
Of course what was said here was unnecessary to the decision of
the case. Nevertheless, the court's position is unequivocal on
whether or not part payment of the undisputed amount would be
sufficient consideration. The court failed to intimate that it was
departing from any earlier views that it had expressed on the
subject.
The doctrine of the Pederson case was reaffirmed in Clubb v.
The Sentinel Life Ins. Co.12 There the plaintiff in his application
for accident insurance stated that his occupation was that of
license inspector. After he had suffered a partial paralysis, the
company was informed that he had ceased to be a license inspector.
The policy provided that in the event that the insured was injured, after having changed his occupation to one classified as
more hazardous, the company would pay only such portion of
the indemnities as the premium paid would have purchased at
the rate fixed for such more hazardous occupation. After a dispute, the controversy was settled by the plaintiff agreeing to
accept weekly total disability benefits of $20, instead of the $25
provided in the policy. The plaintiff thereafter brought suit upon
the policy as originally written. In disposing of the contention that
there was lack of consideration because of the fact that the plaintiff
was compelled to accept what the company admitted and was
willing to pay, the court said:13
"The instant case is very like the case of Pederson v,.
Tacoma ... Among other things, we there said, 'Where a
claim is in dispute, the parties may agree upon an amount
to be paid, which amount, when paid, will constitute an
accord and satisfaction.' "
This case, unlike Pederson v. Tacoma, is squarely in point, since
the $20 paid apparently was a liquidated obligation under the
accepted definition of that term. It is very plain that the court
thought nothing turned on the fact that the defendant admitted it
was paying only what it conceded would be due under the terms
of the policy. The fact that this case is not as similar to the
Pederson case as the court thinks is evidence of its eagerness to
establish the principle suggested in that case.
The court in Cobb Healy Investment Co. v. Tall 4 found that
payment of the liquidated amount due was not an accord and
satisfaction. However, this was for the reason that the parties had
agreed that the check should be merely paid upon account and
therefore the notation on the check that it was in full payment
was ineffective. This result would seem to follow logically enough,
since the parties having agreed that the payment is to be only on
account, there was no dispute which could be the subject of an
accord.
In Bottoroff v. Paige Machinery Co., 5 the plaintiff claimed
"1181 Wash. 284, 42 P. (2d) 792 (1935).
Ibid. 291, 42 P. (2d) 794.
"4181 Wash. 300, 42 P. (2d) 1107 (1935).
1174 Wash. 438, 24 P. (2d) 1059 (1933).
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money for additional services which the defendant denied owing.
The defendant tendered the plaintiff a check in full settlement
for his services, the check being in the amount which the defendant
admitted to be due according to a statement furnished him. The
plaintiff cashed the cheek and then demanded payment of certain
extras not included in the statement. The court in holding that
there was an accord and satisfaction said :16
"The general rule is that, where a debtor sends to his
creditor a cheek for the amount he is willing to pay, and
at that time informs the creditor that he intends the cheek
to be considered as full payment, then, by the acceptance
and cashing of the check, the creditor agrees to the settlement and cannot thereafter seek additional compensation."
Again the case is not squarely in point because the court indicated that it was construing the whole claim to be unliquidated.
It would seem; however, that the facts clearly showed that the
defendant did not dispute the amount he actually paid. But, as
has been pointed out by a writer in a previous issue of this Review, 17 the result is the same in each case whether a liquidated
amount is paid or not, as long as the court is willing to treat
the whole amount as unliquidated. This practice of finding the
whole claim to be unliquidated naturally offers a very convenient
"out" when the reasoning of the minority rule is vigorously
pressed upon the courts.1 8
In Hotel Randolpk Co. v. Waltrous Co.,"9 the court discussed
the consideration question only incidentally to the larger problem
of finding whether the facts showed mutual assent. It used language,
however, unequivocally committing itself to the majority
20
vieW.
The latest expression of the Washington court upon the problem
is Paulsen Estate, Inc. v. Naches-Sela IrrigationDistrict.2 ' Here
the plaintiff was suing to recover interest which had accrued at
the legal rate between the time of the maturity date and the actual
time when the bonds were paid. The defendant conceded that the
bonds and interest-bearing coupons were due, but disputed that
the plaintiff was entitled to interest at the legal rate during the
time that the bonds were in default. The plaintiff finally accepted
a check for the amount which the defendant admitted to be due,
but immediately brought suit for the interest. The plaintiff vigorously argued that the defendant had paid only that much which
it conceded it owed and that hence there was no consideration for
an accord and satisfaction. But the court brushed aside this argument and relied on its previous decisions holding that the payment
of the undisputed amount is sufficient consideration for the extin-Ibid. 442, 24 P. (2d) 1060.

"Shattuck, Accord and Satisfaction in Washington (1934) 8 WASH.
L. REv. 112.
"See James v. Riverside Lumber Co., 121 Wash. 130, 208 Pac. 260
(1922) for a case employing the same approach.
"144 Wash. 215, 257 Pac. 629 (1927).
Ibid. 218, 257 Pac. 630.
-190 Wash. 205, 67 P. (2d) 856 (1937).
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guishment of the entire claim. Thus it would seem that the Washington court, upon a case squarely raising the issue, has deliberately adopted the majority view that it is immaterial that the
debtor concedes the amount he is paying is owing to the creditor,
as long as he disputes in good faith that an additional amount is
due on the whole claim.
On the other hand there are at least four cases in Washington
which apparently deny that there can be an accord and satisfaction of a claim when the debtor pays only that amount which is
liquidated or undisputed.
In Seattle, Renton, etc., R. Co. v. Seattle-Tacoma Power Co.,2""
the plaintiff was suing to prevent the defendant from shutting off
power for not paying the bill. A specific method of computation
of the price of power was provided by the contract between the
parties to determine the monthly charge for power used, but it
was expressly agreed that in any event a minimum charge of
$1,000 was to be paid. The plaintiff sent the defendant a check for
$1,000 each month without regard to the amount of power used and
accompanied the checks with a claim of payment in full, but the
power company sent the plaintiff a statement that the payments
were applied upon account only. The court in denying that there
had been an accord and satisfaction of the entire debt, said :23
"An offer to pay the confessed minimum amount due
can hardly be construed into a payment of the maximum
amount due, nor as a payment in settlement of the whole
controversy... It may be safely asserted that, underlying
all application of accord and satisfaction in cases of both
liquidated and unliquidated accounts, where the creditor
is absolutely and in any event entitled to receive a definite
and fixed sum, but claims an additional sum to be his due,
which additional sum only is disputed by the debtor, the
payment by the debtor of the definite and fixed debt and
its acceptance by the creditor, though tendered as payment in full, will not constitute an accord and satisfaction. ''
This was an unliquidated claim and by the application of the
majority rule the court should have found that the whole debt was
extinguished. The language quoted clearly indicates that the court
in this early case requires the debtor to pay something more than
he concedes lie owes in order that there can be an accord and
satisfaction of the further amount which the debtor disputes. In
Thayer v. Harbican,24 a case in which the court found the whole
claim to be liquidated, the court also used language approving
the minority rule.25
=63 Wash. 639, 116 Pac. 289 (1911).
"Ibid. 646, 116 Pac. 291.
2170 Wash. 278, 126 Pac. 625 (1912).
"Ibid. 284, 126 Pac. 627: "The rule that where a claim is in dispute
and the debtor sends a check to the creditor for a less sum, indorsed as
payment in full of the claim, the retention of the check by the creditor
constitutes an accord and satisfaction, has no application to the case
here presented. That rule only applies where the claim is disputed in
good faith, and only as to the part of the claim so disputed. This case
falls directly within the rule announced in Seattle, Renton, etc., R. Co.
v. Seattle-Tacoma Power Co."
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In Seattle Investors, etc., v. West, etc., Stores, 26 the defendant
attempted to terminate its lease by giving notice that it would
vacate on a certain date and offered to pay rent up to that date..
The defendant sent a check for the amount of this rent and endorsed on the back of it that it was payment in full for all rent
"until end of tenancy". The plaintiff received the check and X'd
out the provision concerning payment in full and cashed the check.
When the plaintiff sued to collect rent for the balance of the
term the defendant contended that the cashing of the check operated as an accord and satisfaction of the whole debt. The court,
after citing the Seattle-Tacoma case, supra, denied the contention
of the defendant, saying :27
"This check was in payment of two months rent, which
at the time was due and payable... When the debtor pays
what he is in law bound to pay and admits he owes, there
is no consideration."
The case is not strictly in point because the future amounts payable under the lease were liquidated. Nevertheless, the court certainly approves the doctrine of the Seattle-Tacoma case here.
Were it not for another recent case it might be safely said that
the minority rule had been entirely repudiated in this state. In
Graham v. New York Life Insurance Co., 28 the plaintiff was suing
to recover for double indemnity on a life insurance policy, claiming that the insured's death was accidental. The defendant contended that the death was a suicide and tendered a check for only
the face amount of the policy which the plaintiff was finally induced to accept. The court's previous decisions holding that payment of the liquidated portion of a debt is sufficient consideration
for the release of the whole claim were strenuously urged upon it.
However, the court held that the acceptance and cashing of the
check did not operate as an accord and satisfaction, saying:29
"Where the debtor pays what in law he is bound to
pay and what he admits that he owes, such payment by the
debtor and its acceptance by the creditor, even though
tendered as payment in full of a larger indebtedness, do
not operate as an accord and satisfaction of the entire indebtedness, because there is no consideration therefor ..
The appellant, by its check, paid only that which it was in
any event bound to pay and that which it admitted to be
due and owing."
The case was probably correctly decided because the facts showed
that the parties had agreed that the acceptance of the check for
the lesser amount would not necessarily release the whole claim.
However, the language quoted is plainly inconsistent with the
previous decisions following the majority rule and in fact reaffirms the doctrine of the Seattle-Tacoma case, which decision the
court cited apparently with approval.
Where, then, are we in Washington with respect to the require-177 Wash. 125,
17biT. 128, 30 P.
23182 Wash. 612,
"Ibid 620, 47 P.

30 P.
(2d)
47 P.
(2d)

(2d) 956 (1934).
958.
(2d) 1029 (1935).
1033.
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ment of consideration in accord and satisfaction? Evidently from
the Paulsen case we are back again to the majority rule. But the
,minority rule has not been repudiated. Certainly it is true that
there is more justification for the majority position. It must be
apparent that the strict enforcement of the doctrine of Pinnel's
Case will inevitably foster bad faith. This would seem to be the
reason that the history of the judicial decision since the announcement of the doctrine shows such a constant effort to escape from
its absurdity and injustice. The modern courts with reluctance
still adhere to it, because of the pressure of stare decisis, and in
spite of the current of condemnation and in face of the demands
and conveniences of a much greater business and more extensive
mercantile dealings and operations. Nevertheless they have wisely
restricted the rule to embrace only those cases within its very letter.
When it is understood that the doctrine of Piunel's Case is not to
be extended beyond its precise import and is not to be employed
whenever the technical reasons for its application do not exist,
then the basis of the majority rule can be more easily justified.
The Washington court in its most recent decision on the subject
has squarely held along with the majority and better reasoned
cases. However, the history of these local decisions shows that the
court has several times changed its position, and therefore it might
be too optimistic to say that Washington has definitely committed
itself to the majority position. The Seattle-Tacoma Power Co. case
was not overruled in the court's latest decision and it must be conceded that that case stands for the minority view. Perhaps the
court will decide to expressly repudiate it when the problem is
again presented.
WmA.& Gouc=x.

